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Abstract
We provide implementation details for non-associative key estab-
lishment protocols. In particular, we describe the implementation of
non-associative key establishment protocols for all left self-distributive
and all mutually left distributive systems.
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1 Introduction
Currently public-key cryptography still relies mainly on a few number-theoretic
problems which remain still unbroken. Nevertheless, after the advent of quan-
tum computers, systems like RSA, Diffie- Hellman and ECC will be broken
easily [11]. Under the label Post Quantum Cryptography, there have been
several efforts to develop new cryptographic primitives which may also serve
for the post quantum computer era. One approach became later known as
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non-commutative cryptography where the commutative groups and rings in-
volved in number-theoretic problems are replaced by non-commutative struc-
tures, and we consider computational problems therein [1]. The scope of non-
commutative cryptography was broadened in [10, 7] as we go beyond non-
commutative, associative binary oparations. We utilize non-associative bi-
nary operations, i.e. magmas, thus hoping to establish non-associative public-
key cryptography. Here we focus on key establishment protocols (KEPs) as
cryptographic primitives, because they are the most important and the hard-
est to construct. In particular, the seminal Anshel-Anshel-Goldfeld (AAG)
KEP for monoids and groups [5] was generalized to a general AAG-KEP for
magmas in [10, 7] which emphasize the important and integrating role of
the AAG protocol in non-commutative and commutative cryptography. Left
self-distributive (LD) systems (and their generalizations) naturally emerge
as possible non-associative platform structures for this AAG-KEP for mag-
mas. Non-associative key establishment protocols for all LD-, multi-LD-, and
other left distributive systems were introduced in [9, 8]. Braid groups (and
their finite quotients), matrix groups and Laver tables as natural platform
LD-structures were discussed in [10, 7, 9, 8]. The purpose of this paper
is to provide details how our non-associative KEPs can be implemented for
all the systems given in [9, 8]. We hope this will encourage cryptanalytic
examination of these new and innovative non-associative KEPs.
Outline. In section 2 we provide examples of LD-systems and mutu-
ally left distributive systems. Section 3 describes the most improved non-
associative KEP (for all mutually left distributive systems). It contains all
other KEPs from [9, 8] as special cases. Finally, section 4 provides imple-
mentation details and pseudo-code.
2 LD-systems and their generalizations
Definition 2.1 (1) An left self-distributive (LD) system (S, ∗) is a set S
equipped with a binary operation ∗ on S which satisfies the left self-distributivity
law
x ∗ (y ∗ z) = (x ∗ y) ∗ (x ∗ z) for all x, y, z ∈ S.
(2) Let I be an index set. A multi-LD-system (S, (∗i)i∈I) is a set S equipped
with a family of binary operations (∗i)i∈I on S such that
x ∗i (y ∗j z) = (x ∗i y) ∗j (x ∗i z) for all x, y, z ∈ S
is satisfied for every i, j in I. Especially, it holds for i = j, i.e., (S, ∗i) is an
LD-system. If |I| = 2 then we call S a bi-LD-system.
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(3) A mutually left distributive system (S, ∗a, ∗b) is a set S equipped with
two binary operations ∗a, ∗b on S such that
x∗a(y∗bz) = (x∗ay)∗b(x∗az) x∗b(y∗az) = (x∗by)∗a(x∗bz) for all x, y, z ∈ S.
More vaguely, we will also use the terms partial multi-LD-system and
simply left distributive system if the laws of a multi-LD-system are only
fulfilled for special subsets of S or if only some of these (left) distributive laws
are satisfied. A mutually left distributive system (L, ∗a, ∗b) is only a partial
bi-LD-system. The left selfdistributivity laws need not hold, i.e., (L, ∗a)
and (L, ∗b) are in general not LD-systems. We list examples of LD-systems,
multi-LD-systems and mutually left distributive systems. More details can
be found in [3, 4, 7, 9, 8].
Conjugacy. A classical example of an LD-system is (G, ∗) where G is a
group equipped with the conjugacy operation x ∗ y = x−1yx (or x ∗rev y =
xyx−1).
Laver tables. Finite groups equipped with the conjugacy operation are
not the only finite LD-systems. Indeed, the socalled Laver tables provide
the classical example for finite LD-systems. There exists for each n ∈ N an
unique LD-system Ln = ({1, 2, . . . , 2
n}, ∗) with k ∗ 1 = k+1. The values for
k ∗ l with l 6= 1 can be computed by induction using the left self-distributive
law. Laver tables are also described in [3].
LD-conjugacy. LetG be a group, and f ∈ End(G). Set x∗fy = f(x
−1y)x,
then (G, ∗f) is an LD-system.
Shifted conjugacy. Consider the braid group on infinitely many strands
B∞ = 〈{σi}i≥1 | σiσj = σjσi for |i− j| ≥ 2, σiσjσi = σjσiσj for |i− j| = 1〉
where inside σi the (i + 1)-th strand crosses over the i-th strand. The shift
map ∂ : B∞ −→ B∞ defined by σi 7→ σi+1 for all i ≥ 1 is an injective
endomorphism. Then B∞ equipped with the shifted conjugacy operations
∗, ∗¯ defined by x ∗ y = ∂x−1 · σ1 · ∂y · x and x ∗¯ y = ∂x
−1 · σ−11 · ∂y · x is a
bi-LD-system. In particular, (B∞, ∗) is an LD-system.
Generalized shifted conjugacy in braid groups. Let, for n ≥ 2, δn =
σn−1 · · ·σ2σ1. For p, q ≥ 1, we set τp,q = δp+1∂(δp+1) · · ·∂
q−1(δp+1).
Proposition 2.2 (B∞, ∗1, ∗2) with binary operations x∗iy = ∂
p(x−1)ai∂
p(y)x
(i = 1, 2) with a1 = a
′
1τ
±1
p,pa
′′
1, a2 = a
′
2τ
±1
p,pa
′′
2 for some a
′
1, a
′′
1, a
′
2, a
′′
2 ∈ Bp is a
mutually left distributive system if and only if [a′1, a
′′
2] = [a
′
2, a
′′
1] = [a
′
1, a
′
2] = 1.
(Note that [a′1, a
′′
1], [a
′
2, a
′′
2] and [a
′′
1, a
′′
2] may be nontrivial. If, in addition
[a′1, a
′′
1] = [a
′
2, a
′′
2] = 1 holds, then (B∞, ∗1, ∗2) is a bi-LD-system.)
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Symmetric conjugacy. For a group G, there exists yet another LD-
operation. (G, ◦) is an LD-system with x ◦ y = xy−1x.
f -symmetric conjugacy. Let G be a group, and f ∈ End(G) an en-
domorphism that is also a projector (f 2 = f). Then (G, ◦f), defined by
x ◦f y = f(xy
−1)x is an LD-system.
3 Non-associative KEPs for mutually left dis-
tributive systems
Here we describe a KEP that works for all mutually left distributive sys-
tems, in particular all bi-LD-systems (and all LD-systems). Consider a set L
equipped with a pool of binary operations OA∪OB (OA and OB non-empty)
s.t. the operations in OA are distributive over those in OB and vice versa,
i.e. the following holds for all x, y, z ∈ L, ∗α ∈ OA and ∗β ∈ OB.
x ∗α (y ∗β z) = (x ∗α y) ∗β (x ∗α z), and (1)
x ∗β (y ∗α z) = (x ∗β y) ∗α (x ∗β z). (2)
Then (L, ∗α, ∗β) is a mutually left distributive system for all (∗α, ∗β) ∈ OA×
OB. Note that, if OA ∩ OB 6= ∅, then (L,OA ∩ OB) is a multi-LD-system.
Let s1, . . . , sm, t1, . . . , tn ∈ L be some public elements. We denote SA =
〈s1, · · · , sm〉OA and SB = 〈t1, · · · , tn〉OB , two submagmas of (L,OA ∪ OB).
For example, an element y of SA can be described by a planar rooted binary
tree T whose k leaves are labelled by these other elements r1, . . . , rk with
ri ∈ {si}i≤m. Here the tree contains further information, namely to each
internal vertex we assign a binary operation ∗i ∈ OA. We use the notation
y = TOA(r1, . . . , rk). The subscript OA tells us that the grafting of subtrees of
T corresponds to the operation ∗i ∈ OA. Consider, for example, the element
y = (s3∗α1 ((s3∗α4 (s1∗α1 s2))∗α2 s1))∗α1 ((s2∗α2 s3)∗α3 s2). The corresponding
labelled planar rooted binary tree T is displayed in the Figure 3.
Let ∗α ∈ OA and ∗β ∈ OB. By induction over the tree depth, it is easy to
show that, for all elements e, e1, . . . , el ∈ (L,OA ∪OB) and all planar rooted
binary trees T with l leaves, the following equations hold.
e ∗α TOB(e1, . . . , el) = TOB(e ∗α e1, . . . , e ∗α el), (3)
e ∗β TOA(e1, . . . , el) = TOA(e ∗β e1, . . . , e ∗β el). (4)
Proposition 3.1 (See Proposition 4.1 in [8].) Consider (L,OA ∪ OB)
such that (L, ∗A, ∗B) is a mutually left distributive system for all (∗A, ∗B) ∈
OA × OB, and let k ∈ N. Then, for all x = (x1, . . . , xk) ∈ L
k, oA =
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Figure 1: (s3 ∗α1 ((s3 ∗α4 (s1 ∗α1 s2)) ∗α2 s1)) ∗α1 ((s2 ∗α2 s3) ∗α3 s2) ∈ SA
s3 s3 s1 s2 s1 s2 s3 s2
∗α1
∗α4
∗α2
∗α1
∗α2
∗α3
∗α1
(∗A1 , . . . , ∗Ak) ∈ O
k
A, and oB = (∗B1, . . . , ∗Bk) ∈ O
k
B, the iterated left mul-
tiplication maps
φ(x,oA) : y 7→ xk ∗Ak (xk−1 ∗Ak−1 · · · ∗A3 (x2 ∗A2 (x1 ∗A1 y)) · · · ) and
φ(x,oB) : y 7→ xk ∗Bk (xk−1 ∗Bk−1 · · · ∗B3 (x2 ∗B2 (x1 ∗B1 y)) · · · )
define a magma endomorphisms of (L,OB) and (L,OA), respectively.
In particular, the following equations hold for all k, l ∈ N, a, b ∈ Lk,
oA ∈ O
k
A, oB ∈ O
k
B, e, e1, . . . , el ∈ L and all planar rooted binary trees T
with l leaves.
φ(a,oA)(TOB(e1, . . . , el)) = TOB(φ(a,oA)(e1), . . . , φ(a,oA)(el)), (5)
φ(b,oB)(TOA(e1, . . . , el)) = TOA(φ(b,oB)(e1), . . . , φ(b,oB)(el)) (6)
Now, we are going to describe a KEP that applies to any system (L,OA∪
OB) as described above. We have two subsets of public elements {s1, · · · , sm}
and {t1, · · · , tn} of L. Also, recall that SA = 〈s1, · · · , sm〉OA and SB =
〈t1, · · · , tn〉OB . Alice and Bob perform the following protocol steps.
Protocol Key establishment for the partial multi-LD-system
(L,OA ∪ OB).
1 Alice generates her secret key (a0, a, oA) ∈ SA×L
kA×OkAA , and Bob chooses
his secret key (b, oB) ∈ S
kB
B × O
kB
B . Denote oA = (∗A1 , . . . , ∗AkA) and
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Figure 2: KEP for the partial multi-LD-system (L,OA ∪ OB).
Alice Bob
{φ(a,oA)(ti)}1≤i≤n, φ(a,oA)(a0)
{φ(b,oB)(sj)}1≤j≤ma0 ∈ SA, a ∈ L
kA , oA ∈ O
kA
A
b ∈ SkBB , oB ∈ O
kB
B
oB = (∗B1 , . . . , ∗BkB ), then Alice’s and Bob’s secret magma morphisms
α and β are given by
α(y) = akA ∗AkA (akA−1 ∗AkA−1 · · · ∗A3 (a2 ∗A2 (a1 ∗A1 y)) · · · ) and
β(y) = bkB ∗BkB (bkB−1 ∗BkB−1 · · · ∗B3 (b2 ∗B2 (b1 ∗B1 y)) · · · ),
respectively.
2 (α(ti))1≤i≤n ∈ L
n, p0 = α(a0) ∈ L, and sends them to Bob. Bob computes
the vector (β(sj))1≤j≤m ∈ L
m, and sends it to Alice.
3 Alice, knowing a0 = TOA(r1, . . . , rl) with ri ∈ {s1, . . . , sm}, computes from
the received message
TOA(β(r1), . . . , β(rl)) = β(TOA(r1, . . . , rl)) = β(a0).
And Bob, knowing for all 1 ≤ j ≤ kB, bj = T
(j)
OB
(uj,1, . . . , uj,lj) with
uj,i ∈ {t1, . . . , tn}∀i ≤ lj for some lj ∈ N, computes from his received
message for all 1 ≤ j ≤ kB
T
(j)
OB
(α(uj,1), . . . , α(uj,lj)) = α(T
(j)
OB
(uj,1, . . . , uj,lj) = α(bj).
4 Alice computes KA = α(β(a0)). Bob gets the shared key by
KB := α(bkB) ∗ (α(bkB−1) ∗ (· · · (α(b2) ∗ (α(b1) ∗ p0)) · · · ))
αhomo
= KA.
Here the operation vectors oA ∈ O
kA
A and oB ∈ O
kB
B are part of Alice’s
and Bob’s private keys. Also explicit expressions of a0 ∈ SA and all bi ∈ SB
as treewords T, T (i) (for all 1 ≤ i ≤ kB) are also parts of the private keys -
though we did not mention it explicitly in step 1 of the protocols. But here
TOA and T
′
OB
also contain all the information about the grafting operations
(in OA or OB, respectively) at the internal vertices of T , T
(1), . . . , T (kB).
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4 Implementation
Planar rooted binary trees We need some efficient way to encode the planar
rooted binary tree which determines the bracket structure of an element given
as product of other elements. Let PBTn denote the set of planar rooted
binary trees (also known as full binary trees) with n internal nodes (and
n + 1 leaves), then |PBTn| = Cat(n) where Cat(n) =
1
n+1
(
2n
n
)
denotes the
n-th Catalan number. There exists a rich variety of other Catalan sets with
well understood bijections between them, e.g., diagonal avoiding paths (aka
mountain ranges), polygon triangulations, Dyck words, planar rooted trees
(not only binary) and non-crossing partitions. We use the following succinct
representation for Catalan sets taken from [2]. Denote [n] = {1, . . . , n}. To
each T ∈ PBTn we associate a vector (array) T ∈ [n]
n such that T [i] ≤ T [j]
for i < j and T [i] ≤ i for all i ∈ [n]. By abuse of notation we call the set of
such vectors in [n]n also PBTn.
function EvaluateTree;
Input: (T, o, (e1, . . . , en+1)) ∈ PBTn ×O
n × Ln+1.
Output: e = To(e1, . . . , en+1)
for j := n to 1 by -1 do
pos := T [j];
Seq[pos] := Seq[pos] ∗o[pos] Seq[pos+ 1];
Remove(˜ Seq, pos+ 1); Remove(˜ T, pos); Remove(˜ o, pos);
end
return Seq[1];
Let L be a magma and O be a set of binary operations on L. Given a vec-
tor of operations o = (∗o[1], . . . , ∗o[n]) ∈ O
n and a sequence of leave elements
(e1, . . . , en+1) ∈ L
n+1, then the function EvaluateTree evaluates the product of
e1, . . . , en+1 where the bracket structure is given by the tree T and the opera-
tions on the internal vertices of T are given by o. For example, the tree in Fig-
ure 1 is given by T = [1, 1, 2, 2, 3, 6, 6] and o = (∗α2 , ∗α3, ∗α1 , ∗α4, ∗α2 , ∗α1 , ∗α1).
Protocol implementation. Now, let (L,OA, OB) be as described in the
KEP. We fix some distributions on L, OA and OB, so that we may generate
random elements from these sets (according to these distributions). Given
ma, mB ∈ N, Alice and Bob first choose random vectors GA = (s1, . . . , smA) ∈
LmA and GB = (t1, . . . , tmB) ∈ L
mB which determine the public submagmas
SA = 〈GA〉OA and SB = 〈GB〉OB , respectively. Then Alice and Bob generate
their secret, public and shared keys as described in the following functions.
The KEPs were implemented using MAGMA [12] which also contains an
implementation of braid groups following [6].
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function GeneratePrivateKeyAlice;
Input: GA ∈ L
mA .
Output: (Ia0, Ta0, oa0, a0, a, oA) ∈
[mA]
na0+1 × PBTna0 × O
na0
A × L× L
kA × OkAA
Ia0 ← Random([mA]
na0 );
for i := 1 to na0 + 1 do Seqa0[i] := GA[Ia0[i]];
Ta0 ← Random(PBTna0 ); oa0 ← Random(O
na0
A );
a0 := EvaluateTree(Ta0, oa0, Seqa0);
a← Random(LkA); oA← Random(OkAA );
return (Ia0, Ta0, oa0, a0, a, oA);
function GeneratePrivateKeyBob;
Input: GB ∈ L
mB .
Output: (Ib, T b, ob, b, oB) ∈
([mB]
nb+1)kB × (PBTnb)
kB × (OnbA )
kB × LkB ×OkBB
for k := 1 to kB do
Ib[k] ← Random([mB]
nb);
for i := 1 to nb + 1 do Seqb[k][i] := GA[Ia0[i]];
Tb[k] ← Random(PBTnb); ob← Random(O
nb
B );
b[k] := EvaluateTree(Tb[k], ob[k], Seqb[k]);
end
oB ← Random(OkBB );
return (Ib, T b, ob, b, oB);
function GeneratePublicKeyAlice;
Input: (a, oA, a0,GB) ∈ L
kA × OkAA × L× L
mB .
Output: (pA, p0) ∈ L
mA × L
for k := 1 to mA do
pA[k] := GB[k];
for i := 1 to kA do pA[k] := a[i] ∗oA[i] pA[k];
end
p0 := a0;
for i := 1 to kA do p0[k] := a[i] ∗oA[i] p0[k];
return (pA, p0);
function GeneratePublicKeyBob;
Input: (b, oB,GA) ∈ L
kB × OkBB × L
mA .
Output: pB ∈ L
mB
for k := 1 to mB do
pB[k] := GA[k];
for i := 1 to kB do pB[k] := b[i] ∗oB[i] pB[k];
end
return pB;
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function GenerateSharedKeyAlice;
Input: (Ia0, Ta0, oa0, a, oA, pB) ∈
[mA]
na0+1 × PBTna0 × O
na0
A × L
kA ×OkAA × L
mB .
Output: KA ∈ L
KA := EvaluateTree(Ta0, oa0, (pB[Ia0[i]])i≤na0+1);
for k := 1 to kA do KA := a[k] ∗oA[k] KA;
return KA;
function GenerateSharedKeyBob;
Input: (Ib, T b, ob, b, oB, pA, p0) ∈
([mB]
nb+1)kB × (PBTnb)
kB × (OnbA )
kB × LkB ×OkBB × L
mA × L.
Output: KA ∈ L
Initialize lfactors := []; KB := p0;
for k := 1 to kB do
lfactors[k] := EvaluateTree(Tb[k], ob[k], (pA[Ib[k][i]])i≤nb+1);
KB := lfactors[k] ∗oB[k] KB;
end
return KA;
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